IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cge/wacage/08.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Leader as Catalyst: On Mass Movements and the Mechanics of Institutional Change

Author

Listed:
  • Mukand, Sharun; Majumdar, Sumon

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Why are some leaders able to rally mass support and successfully catalyze revolutionary change while others fail? We argue that the key to understanding a leader’s effectiveness lies in dissecting the symbiotic relationship between the leader and his committed activist-followers. Good leaders attract committed activist-followers. In turn, these followers have a bottom-up role in empowering the leader by rallying support from the broader populace, resulting in a mass movement. This two way leader-follower interaction can endogenously give rise to threshold effects: ‘small’ differences in leader ability have a dramatic impact on the prospects for change. Therefore, while underlying structural conditions and institutions are important, there is an independent first-order role for individual agency in bringing about institutional change and development. We show that for a leader ‘it is better to be feared than loved’. An ambitious, self-serving leader attracts activistfollowers who fear bad institutional change and hope to insulate themselves by becoming loyal followers. Indeed by empowering such a self-serving leader, these followers make him a more effective agent of (both good and bad) institutional change.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukand, Sharun; Majumdar, Sumon, 2010. "The Leader as Catalyst: On Mass Movements and the Mechanics of Institutional Change," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 08, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:08
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/08.2010_mukand.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    2. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    3. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 711-756, May.
    4. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818728.
    5. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    6. Dewan, Torun & Myatt, David P., 2007. "Leading the Party: Coordination, Direction, and Communication," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 827-845, November.
    7. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524131.
    8. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818735.
    9. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524124.
    10. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    11. Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 835-864.
    12. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818742.
    13. Dewatripont,Mathias & Hansen,Lars Peter & Turnovsky,Stephen J. (ed.), 2003. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521524117.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sharun Mukand & Sumon Majumdar, 2007. "The Leader As Catalyst: On Leadership And The Mechanics Of Institutional Change," Working Paper 1128, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. , & ,, 2013. "Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    3. Abraham Aldama & Mateo Vásquez-Cortés & Lauren Elyssa Young, 2019. "Fear and citizen coordination against dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 103-125, January.
    4. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    5. Albert Banal‐Estañol & Jo Seldeslachts, 2011. "Merger Failures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 589-624, June.
    6. , L., 2013. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    7. Matt Malis & Alastair Smith, 2021. "State Visits and Leader Survival," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 241-256, January.
    8. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2018. "Experiments on macroeconomics: methods and applications," Working Papers 1810, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    9. Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2013. "Contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 386-400.
    10. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets," CEIS Research Paper 245, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Jul 2012.
    11. , & , P. & , & ,, 2015. "Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    12. Romeo Matthew Balanquit, 2016. "Threshold Bank-run Equilibrium in Dynamic Games," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201607, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    13. Iachan, Felipe S. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2015. "Information quality and crises in regime-change games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 739-768.
    14. Tijmen Daniëls, 2009. "Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 417-439, December.
    15. Benoît S. Y. Crutzen & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2013. "Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 744-767, December.
    16. Kim, Minseong & Kim, Young-Han, 2013. "When does coordination for free trade regimes fail?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 31-36.
    17. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2018. "Experiments on macroeconomics: methods and applications," Working Papers halshs-01809937, HAL.
    18. Li Mei, 2012. "Coordination Failure in Investment, Economic Growth, and Volatility," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, March.
    19. Xuewen Liu, 2015. "Short-Selling Attacks and Creditor Runs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 814-830, April.
    20. John Geanakoplos & Robert Axtell & J. Doyne Farmer & Peter Howitt & Benjamin Conlee & Jonathan Goldstein & Matthew Hendrey & Nathan M. Palmer & Chun-Yi Yang, 2012. "Getting at Systemic Risk via an Agent-Based Model of the Housing Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 53-58, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jane Snape (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.