Privatization under Asymmetric Information
This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.
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- Aoki, Masahiko, 1982.
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American Economic Review,
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- Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder-Employee Cooperative Game," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 9, pages 141-142 Edward Elgar.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
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