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Privatization under Asymmetric Information

  • Dieter Bös
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    This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.

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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2000/wp-cesifo-2000-01/WP244.PDF
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    Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 244.

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    Date of creation: 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_244
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    1. Aoki, Masahiko, 1982. "Equilibrium Growth of the Hierarchical Firm: Shareholder-Employee Cooperative Game Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1097-1110, December.
    2. Bos, Dieter & Nett, Lorenz, 1991. "Employee Share Ownership and Privatisation: A Comment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 966-69, July.
    3. Freixas, Xavier & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1985. "Average cost pricing versus marginal cost pricing under moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 135-146, March.
    4. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-37, May.
    6. Aoki, Masahiko, 1980. "A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder-Employee Cooperative Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 600-610, September.
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