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A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder-Employee Cooperative Game

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  • Aoki, Masahiko

Abstract

This volume collects 22 articles by Masahiko Aoki, selected from writings published over the course of his 45-year academic career. These fascinating essays cover a range of issues, including mechanism design, comparative governance, corporate governance, institutions and institutional change, but are tied together by a focus on East Asia and a comparative institutional framework.
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Suggested Citation

  • Aoki, Masahiko, 1980. "A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder-Employee Cooperative Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 600-610, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:70:y:1980:i:4:p:600-610
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorgensen, Steffen & Kort, Peter M. & Van Schijndel, Geert-Jan C. Th., 1989. "Optimal investment, financing, and dividends : A stackelberg differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 339-377, July.
    2. McCain , Roger, 2013. "Bargaining Power and Majoritarian Allocations," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2013-9, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    3. Sen, Anindya & Sikdar, Soumyen, 1997. "The choice of organizational form in strategic contexts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 539-546, April.
    4. H. Schneider, 1983. "Mitbestimmung, unvollständige Information und Leistungsanreize: Überlegungen zu einer funktionsfähigen Unternehmensverfassung," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 119(III), pages 337-355, September.
    5. Gérard Charreaux, 2004. "Corporate Governance Theories: From Micro Theories to National Systems Theories," Working Papers CREGO 1041202, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    6. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    7. Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2000. "Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination," NBER Working Papers 7945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Steen Thomsen & Caspar Rose & Dorte Kronborg, 2016. "Employee representation and board size in the Nordic countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 471-490, December.
    9. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1985. "Management versus ownership, II," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 115-138, March.
    10. Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 1996. "Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 339-368, December.
    11. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Shuzhong Shi & Guofu Tan, 2015. "Nash bargaining for log-convex problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 413-440, April.
    12. Gérard Charreaux, 2004. "Les théories de la gouvernance:de la gouvernance des entreprises à la gouvernance des systèmes nationaux," Working Papers CREGO 1040101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    13. Sridhar Balasubramanian & Pradeep Bhardwaj, 2004. "When Not All Conflict Is Bad: Manufacturing-Marketing Conflict and Strategic Incentive Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(4), pages 489-502, April.
    14. Kamijo, Yoshio & Tomaru, Yoshihiro, 2014. "The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 101-109.
    15. Aurora Trif & Malcolm Brady, 2013. "Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 258-275, May.
    16. Cecilia Navarra, 2013. "How do worker cooperatives stabilize employment? The role of profit reinvestment into locked assets," Working Papers 1307, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    17. Dieter Bös, 2000. "Privatization under Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 244, CESifo Group Munich.

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