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Equilibrium Growth of the Hierachical Firm: Shareholder-Employee Cooperative Game Approach

In: Comparative Institutional Analysis

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  • Masahiko Aoki

Abstract

This volume collects 22 articles by Masahiko Aoki, selected from writings published over the course of his 45-year academic career. These fascinating essays cover a range of issues, including mechanism design, comparative governance, corporate governance, institutions and institutional change, but are tied together by a focus on East Asia and a comparative institutional framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Equilibrium Growth of the Hierachical Firm: Shareholder-Employee Cooperative Game Approach," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 10, pages 143-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15474_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2000. "Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination," NBER Working Papers 7945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jyh‐Bang Jou & Tan (Charlene) Lee, 2021. "Uncertainty, hiring and firing costs, and the determinants of profit‐sharing rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 185-197, January.
    3. Sridhar Balasubramanian & Pradeep Bhardwaj, 2004. "When Not All Conflict Is Bad: Manufacturing-Marketing Conflict and Strategic Incentive Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(4), pages 489-502, April.
    4. Rayenda Khresna Brahmana & Hui San Loh & Maria Kontesa, 2020. "Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Agency Cost," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 21(4), pages 937-955, August.
    5. Kamijo, Yoshio & Tomaru, Yoshihiro, 2014. "The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm: A Nash bargaining approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 101-109.
    6. Dieter Bös, 2000. "Privatization under Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 244, CESifo.

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    Keywords

    Asian Studies; Economics and Finance;

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