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A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation

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Abstract

We propose a multidimensional spatial model of political competition where the advertising campaign aims at influencing the weights that voters’ preferences assign to different political issues. The campaign strategies will move the vote of those voters who lack of partisan identification. The equilibrium analysis of the proposed electoral game yields insights into the chances that the ex-ante loser political party has of winning the elections when there is electoral campaign. We show that the ex-ante loser can end up winning the elections even when (1) it has less campaign funds than its opponent and, (2) it has no advantage on any single political issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy, 2004. "A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/20, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
    2. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-660, May.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:33-47_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Election campaign; political issues; preferences manipulation; positional voting.;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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