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Provisión eficiente de inversión pública financiada con impuestos distorsionantes

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a simple general equilibrium model with public investment and distorting taxes. First, we obtain the optimality conditions for public investment provision under different tax systems. Also we discuss whether tax revenue is increased by the complementary between productive public spending and taxed goods, ceteris paribus. Second, a more restrictive framework for government is presented: tax rates are fixed ex ante. This case is simulated numerically and we find some interesting consequences on public investment levels, total and marginal cost of public funds and tax revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • José Manuel González-Páramo & Diego Martínez López, 2002. "Provisión eficiente de inversión pública financiada con impuestos distorsionantes," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2002/08, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2002_08
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Infrastructures; taxes; efficiency; social welfare.;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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