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Openness, Open Source, and the Veil of Ignorance

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  • Scotchmer, Suzanne

Abstract

The open source movement evolved in the one industrial context where openness is not required by intellectual property law.1 Nevertheless, openness itself cannot be the driving force behind the open source movement. This is because openness can be achieved in many ways other than the GPL, for example, with proprietary licenses, or licenses that are even more permissive than the GPL, such as the BSD license. Early commentators explained this new development model by focussing on the motives of the programmer, such as to demonstrate skills. See the survey by Stephen M. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer (2006). But firms also participate in open-source collaborations, sometimes contributing significant resources (Joachim Henkel, 2006, Dirk Riehle, 2009). Doing so can be profitable even if the contributors are rivals in the market. The quality improvements or cost reductions provided by a rival’s open-source contributions may outweigh the deleterious effect of empowering the rival to be a better competitor.

Suggested Citation

  • Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2010. "Openness, Open Source, and the Veil of Ignorance," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt4d9052w7, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt4d9052w7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring.
    2. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Erkal, Nisvan, 2009. "Scarcity of Ideas and R&D Options: Use it, Lose it or Bank it," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1295k6gg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1999. "On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, Summer.
    4. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2006. "Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm," NBER Working Papers 12148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques‐François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, March.
    6. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
    7. Justin Pappas Johnson, 2002. "Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 637-662, December.
    8. Mikko Mustonen, 2005. "When Does a Firm Support Substitute Open Source Programming?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 121-139, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Darmon & Dominique Torre, 2010. "Open source, dual licensing and software compétition," Post-Print halshs-00497623, HAL.
    2. Hasnas, Irina & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014. "Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 79-87.
    3. Cristiano Antonelli, 2019. "A reappraisal of the Arrovian postulate and the intellectual property regime: user-specific patents," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 377-388, June.
    4. Massimo D'Antoni & Maria Alessandra Rossi, 2014. "Appropriability and Incentives with Complementary Innovations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 103-124, March.
    5. Jürgen Bitzer & Ingo Geishecker & Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2017. "Is there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? – signalling, learning and noise," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(14), pages 1379-1394, March.
    6. Sergio Petralia, 2024. "GitPat: A Database Linking Open Source Contributions & Patenting Activity of Organizations," Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography (PEEG) 2437, Utrecht University, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Group Economic Geography, revised Nov 2024.
    7. Öcalan-Özel, Sıla & Pénin, Julien, 2019. "Invention characteristics and the degree of exclusivity of university licenses: The case of two leading French research universities," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1445-1457.
    8. Liang, Pinghan & Xiao, Shukang, 2022. "Pray, vote, and money: The double-edged sword effect of religions on rural political participation in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    9. Natalia Candelo & Rachel T. A. Croson & Sherry Xin Li, 2017. "Identity and social exclusion: an experiment with Hispanic immigrants in the U.S," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 460-480, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    open source; software development; general public license; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Law; Technology and Innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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