Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin?
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References listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:03:p:545-558_21 is not listed on IDEAS
- Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
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KeywordsCostly Information Acquisition; Condorcet Jury Theorem.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-02-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-02-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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