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Refusals to deal, Price Discrimination and Independent Service Organizations

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Abstract

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organization, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' programs of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.
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  • Zhiqi Chen & Tom Ross, 1993. "Refusals to deal, Price Discrimination and Independent Service Organizations," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 93-01, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:car:ciorup:93-01
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Kende, 1998. "Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 307-326, June.
    2. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2014. "Robert Bork's Contributions to Antitrust Perspectives on Tying Behavior," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 121-144.
    3. Lee, Jinhyuk & Park, Jaeok, 2014. "Pricing Of Complementary Goods As An Implicit Financial Arrangement," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 55(2), pages 207-228, December.
    4. Keeler, James B., 2022. "On the Right to Repair Agricultural Equipment," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322398, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Cabral, Luís, 2014. "Aftermarket power and foremarket competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 60-69.
    6. Miao, Chun-Hui, 2022. "The pricing of ancillary goods when selling on a platform," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    7. Severin Borenstein & Jeffrey K. Mackie‐Mason & Janet S. Netz, 2000. "Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 157-188, June.
    8. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220, Elsevier.
    9. Jota Ishikawa & Hodaka Morita & Hiroshi Mukunoki, 2016. "Trade liberalization and aftermarket services for imports," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 719-764, October.
    10. Baake Pio, 2010. "Accidents, Liability Obligations and Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, May.
    11. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 230-255, February.
    12. Renato Gomes & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Missed Sales and the Pricing of Ancillary Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(4), pages 2097-2169.
    13. Pekka Sääskilahti, 2016. "Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 313-333, April.
    14. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 1999. "Refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 399-417, April.
    15. Dainis Zēgners & Tobias Kretschmer, 2017. "Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 96-122, February.
    16. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
    17. Cabral, Luis, 2008. "Aftermarket Power and Basic Market Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 6802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 273-302, June.
    19. Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 54-91, April.
    20. Patrick DeGraba, 1996. "Why Lever into a Zero‐Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 433-447, September.
    21. David L. Kaserman, 2007. "Efficient Durable Good Pricing And Aftermarket Tie‐In Sales," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 533-537, July.
    22. Laussel, Didier & Resende, Joana, 2014. "Dynamic price competition in aftermarkets with network effects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 106-118.

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