Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions
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- Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2015. "Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 1-4.
References listed on IDEAS
- Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
- Lones Smith, 2011. "Frictional Matching Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 319-338, September.
- Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000.
"Assortative Matching and Search,"
Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1998. "Assortive Matching and Search," Papers 98-09, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-887, November.
- Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014. "Stable marriages and search frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 163-195.
- Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
- Margaret Stevens, 2007. "New Microfoundations For The Aggregate Matching Function," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 847-868, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Häfner, Samuel & Nöldeke, Georg, 2016.
"Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests,"
2016/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Häfner, Samuel, 2018. "Sorting in Iterated Incumbency Contests," Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Steady states in matching and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 206-228.
- Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
More about this item
KeywordsSearch; Matching; Bargaining; Steady-State Equilibrium;
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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