Is there a majority to support a capital tax cut?
A capital income tax cut must in general be financed by increasing other taxes, and thus will have redistributive effects. This paper studies analytically the redistribution implied by a capital income tax cut in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model when agents differ in wealth and human capital and markets are frictionless. A few parameters a¤ect the efficiency benefits and redistributive costs of capital taxation, and determine the set of agents who are in favor of a capital income tax cut. For plausible parameter values, a majority would lose from the tax cut, i.e. high capital taxes may be politically sustainable.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215|
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mankiw, N. Gregory & Weinzierl, Matthew, 2006.
"Dynamic scoring: A back-of-the-envelope guide,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1415-1433, September.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, 2004. "Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide," NBER Working Papers 11000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, 2005. "Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2057, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 211-223, April.
- Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter," 2006 Meeting Papers 78, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Bassetto & Jess Benhabib, 2006. "Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter," Working Paper Series WP-06-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-622, May.
- Jaume Ventura & Francesco Caselli, 2000. "A Representative Consumer Theory of Distribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 909-926, September.
- Caselli, G & Ventura, J, 1996. "A Representative Consumer Theory of Distribution," Papers 534, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- Caselli, F. & Ventura, J., 1996. "A Representative Consumer Theory of Distribution," Working papers 96-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Taxing capital income: a bad idea," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-17.
- Floden, Martin, 2009. "Why Are Capital Income Taxes So High?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(03), pages 279-304, June.
- Floden, Martin, 2006. "Why Are Capital Income Taxes So High?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 623, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Flodén, Martin, 2007. "Why Are Capital Income Taxes So High?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Casey Mulligan, 2004. "What Do Aggregate Consumption Euler Equations Say About the Capital-Income Tax Burden?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 166-170, May.
- Casey B. Mulligan, 2004. "What do Aggregate Consumption Euler Equations Say about the Capital Income Tax Burden?," NBER Working Papers 10262, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Sagiri Kitao & Dirk Krueger, 2009. "Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea after All!," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 25-48, March.
- Juan C. Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 2004. "Taxing Capital: Not a Bad Idea After All," 2004 Meeting Papers 403, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Conesa, Juan Carlos & Kitao, Sagiri & Krueger, Dirk, 2006. "Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!," CEPR Discussion Papers 5929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Conesa, Juan Carlos & Kitao, Sagiri & Krueger, Dirk, 2006. "Taxing capital? Not a bad idea after all!," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/21, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Juan Carlos Conesa & Sagiri Kitao & Dirk Krueger, 2007. "Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!," NBER Working Papers 12880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Santiago Budria Rodriguez & Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Vincenzo Quadrini & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2002. "Updated facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income, and wealth," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 2-35.
- David Domeij & Jonathan Heathcote, 2004. "On The Distributional Effects Of Reducing Capital Taxes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 523-554, 05.
- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
- Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 59-83, October.
- Kenneth L. Judd, 1982. "Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model," Discussion Papers 572, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chatterjee, Satyajit, 1994. "Transitional dynamics and the distribution of wealth in a neoclassical growth model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 97-119, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2008-001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gillian Gurish)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.