Target setting and Allocative Inefficiency in Lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks
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More about this item
KeywordsCapital allocation; incentive design; Chinese banking;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BAN-2019-06-17 (Banking)
- NEP-HRM-2019-06-17 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-TRA-2019-06-17 (Transition Economics)
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