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The Extreme Points of Mean-Preserving Contractions

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Kleiner

  • Benny Moldovanu

  • Philipp Strack

  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

We study multidimensional mean-preserving contractions (MPC) and their ex treme points. Proposition 1 focuses on extreme MPCs of a measure µ: each finitely supported extreme MPC ν induces a partition of X, the domain of µ, into convex sets such that the support of ν on each element of the partition is an affinely indepen dent set, and such that the restriction of ν on each element of the partition is itself an MPC of the restriction of the prior µ on that element. We apply our results to several questions concerning moment persuasion and categorization. In particular, we prove that categories and prototypes (key elements typically assumed to be exogenous in the classical literature on categorization) can endogenously emerge as outcomes of optimization when the decision maker faces limits on the amount of information that she can either acquire or process.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "The Extreme Points of Mean-Preserving Contractions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_777, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_777
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp777
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    2. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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