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Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes

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  • Francesc Dilmé

Abstract

An equilibrium outcome of a game in extensive form is fully self-justifiable if it is supported by justifiable equilibria (McLennan, 1985) regardless of the order in which actions implausible under the given outcome are excluded. We show that the set of fully self-justifiable outcomes is non-empty and contains the set of sequentially stable outcomes (Dilmé, 2024). In signaling games, fully self-justifiable outcomes pass all the selection criteria in Cho and Kreps (1987). Full self-justifiability allows for the systematic use of the logic of selection criteria in signaling games to select equilibria in any finite extensive form game.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesc Dilmé, 2025. "Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_702, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_702
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-649, May.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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