The fuzzy value of patent litigation under imprecise information
The vague notion of "probabilistic patents" is formalized through a model whichcombines real option theory and a fuzzy methodology. The imprecise estimates the patent holder possesses about her future profits, the validity and scope of the patent, the litigation costs, the court's decision etc. under a regime of imperfect enforcement of property rights are specified modelling uncertainty with fuzzy sets. Such methodology is embedded within a real option approach, where the value of a patent includes the option value of litigation. We study how the value of a patent is affected by the timing and incidence of litigation. The main results are compared with the empirical findings of previous results.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna|
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven Shavell, 1989. "Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 183-195, Summer.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:677. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.