Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence
This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which the indicted and the enforcer can negotiate the level of the penalty by means of a settlement. The emphasis of the analysis is on the credibility of the settlement other: the enforcer cannot threaten an incredibly large conviction rate if the negotiation fails. The introduction of the negotiation stage brings about several novel features of the optimal enforcement policy, one of which is the possibility that a ¯nite penalty is optimal (globally or locally). We show that the skimming process associated with the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the enforcer to carry out thorough investigations and increases the rate of noncompliance.
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- BOADWAY, Robin & MARCEAU, Nicolas & MARCHAND, Maurice, "undated". "Time-consistent criminal sanctions," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1337, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- BOADWAY, Robin & MARCEAU, Nicolas & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1994. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," CORE Discussion Papers 1994010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robin W. Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Working Papers 883, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- L. A. Franzoni, 1995. "Tax Amnesties, Plea Bargains and the Optional Enforcement Policy," Working Papers 221, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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- Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-348, October.
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- Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1986. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," Working Papers 616, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December.
- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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