The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited
Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
|Date of creation:||Jul 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
- Pablo BraÒas-Garza & Shoshana Neuman, 2004.
"Analyzing Religiosity within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish Catholics,"
Review of Economics of the Household,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-22, 03.
- Garza, Pablo Brañas & Neuman, Shoshana, 2003. "Analyzing Religiosity Within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish Catholics," IZA Discussion Papers 868, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Robert J. Barro & Rachel McCleary, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.