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Regulating big tech

Author

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  • Luigi Zingales

Abstract

Digital markets are global in nature and prone to "tipping". The combination of these two factors makes the distortions of the inevitable monopolies in these markets very large, but it also undermines any effort at dealing with these distortions at a national level. I argue that the problem can only be solved by structural interventions that restore conditions for competition. Yet, no national regulator will have the ability to do so. Regulation can only arise in an international context. Paradoxically, the increasing international tension can create political opportunities for such international regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Zingales, 2022. "Regulating big tech," BIS Working Papers 1063, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:1063
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
    2. Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K., 2010. "Against Intellectual Monopoly," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521127264, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Big tech; regulation; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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