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A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games

Author

Listed:
  • Sudhölter, Peter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Peleg, Bezalel

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel, 2017. "A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 323, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:323
    as

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2909889/2910055
    File Function: First Version, 2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bezalel Peleg, 1993. "An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games: A Correction," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 765-765, August.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel, 1992. "Axiomatizations of the core," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 397-412, Elsevier.
    3. Bezalel Peleg, 1989. "An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 448-456, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gooni Orshan & Peter Sudholter, 2001. "Reconfirming the Prenucleolus," Discussion Paper Series dp267, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Guni Orshan & Peter Sudhölter, 2010. "The positive core of a cooperative game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 113-136, March.

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