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Moving Out: Geoeconomic Policy and the Relocation of Foreign Affiliates

Author

Listed:
  • Luca Barbaglia

    (Joint Research Centre, European Commission)

  • Marina Diakonova

    (Banco de España)

  • Luis Díez-Catalán

    (Banco de España)

  • Corinna Ghirelli

    (Banco de España)

  • Alice Lia

    (Banco de España)

  • Javier J. Pérez

    (Banco de España)

  • Stefano Verzillo

    (Joint Research Centre, European Commission)

Abstract

Governments increasingly use trade and industrial policy to reshape where multinationals produce, yet standard measures of this geoeconomic pressure are aggregate and cannot detect origin-specific discrimination. We build a bilateral, directional index of relative protectionism that measures how restrictive a destination is toward a given origin. We combine it with bilateral geopolitical risk indices and global ownership links over the period 2010-21, and estimate a gravity-type Poisson-Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model with three-way fixed effects. Our results show that where bilateral protectionism is greater, foreign-affiliate presence is markedly smaller: a 1 percentage point increase in the index is associated with 1.3% fewer subsidiaries than that origin-destination pair would otherwise have. The main mechanism runs through an operational hostility channel (e.g. discriminatory subsidies, procurement exclusion), which outweighs an offsetting tariff-jumping channel and concentrates in non-tradable sectors, where serving the market requires local presence. The estimates show no evidence of anticipation and are robust to longer lags and sample splits. Bilateral geopolitical risk enters with the same negative sign, adding a smaller but complementary layer of fragmentation risk to the effect of geoeconomic policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Barbaglia & Marina Diakonova & Luis Díez-Catalán & Corinna Ghirelli & Alice Lia & Javier J. Pérez & Stefano Verzillo, 2026. "Moving Out: Geoeconomic Policy and the Relocation of Foreign Affiliates," Working Papers 2633, Banco de España.
  • Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:2633e
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.53479/44485
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F60 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - General
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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