A Meta-Analysis of Tax Compliance Experiments
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March.
- Robert Goldfarb, 1995. "The economist-as-audience needs a methodology of plausible inference," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 201-222.
- Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
- Chris Starmer, 2000. "Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 332-382, June.
- T. D. Stanley, 2001. "Wheat from Chaff: Meta-analysis as Quantitative Literature Review," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 131-150, Summer.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019.
"Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2024. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-054, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Armenak Antinyan & Zareh Asatryan, 2020. "Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 8500, CESifo.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2014. "Tax Evasion by Individuals," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201409, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
- Coricelli, Giorgio & Rusconi, Elena & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014.
"Tax evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-61.
- Giorgio Coricelli & Elena Rusconi & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Tax Evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory," Post-Print halshs-00781057, HAL.
- Tonin, Mirco, 2011. "Too Low to Be True: The Use of Minimum Thresholds to Fight Tax Evasion," IZA Discussion Papers 5509, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2016. "Optimal dynamic tax evasion: A portfolio approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 115-129.
- Zsófia L. Bárány, 2017.
"Taxation and self-employment,"
LIS Working papers
723, LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg.
- Zsofia Barany, 2018. "Taxation and Self-Employment," Working Papers hal-03393144, HAL.
- Zsofia Barany, 2018. "Taxation and Self-Employment," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393144, HAL.
- Zsofia Barany, 2018. "Taxation and Self-Employment," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393144, HAL.
- Langenmayr, Dominika, 2017.
"Voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes — Increasing revenue, or increasing incentives to evade?,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 110-125.
- Dominika Langenmayr, 2017. "Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes—Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?," NBER Chapters, in: Personal Income Taxation and Household Behavior (TAPES), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Langenmayr, Dominika, 2014. "Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?," Discussion Papers in Economics 21359, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Dominika Langenmayr, 2015. "Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5349, CESifo.
- Langenmayr, Dominika, 2015. "Voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes - Increasing revenue, or increasing incentives to evade?," Munich Reprints in Economics 27308, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Langenmayr, Dominika Irma, 2015. "Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113101, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Chiarini, Bruno & Ferrara, Maria & Marzano, Elisabetta, 2022. "Tax evasion and financial accelerator: A corporate sector analysis for the US business cycle," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
- Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2018.
"The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment,"
National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 71(3), pages 547-588, September.
- Gemmell, Norman & Ratto, Marisa, 2017. "The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment," Working Paper Series 6769, Victoria University of Wellington, Chair in Public Finance.
- Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2019. "The effects of penalty information on tax compliance: evidence from a New Zealand field experiment," Working Papers hal-02302534, HAL.
- Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017.
"The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.
- Michael Hallsworth & John List & Robert Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The Behavioralist As Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance," NBER Working Papers 20007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John List & Robert Metcalfe & Michael Taylor & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Natural Field Experiments 00391, The Field Experiments Website.
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2013.
"Progressive taxation and tax morale,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 293-316, June.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Peichl, Andreas, 2010. "Progressive Taxation and Tax Morale," IZA Discussion Papers 5378, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2hpm2pgsb78r2a2lh6ahev49mj is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2hpm2pgsb78r2a2lh6ahev49mj is not listed on IDEAS
- Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
- Sugata Marjit & Suryaprakash Mishra & Sandip Mitra, 2019. "Sham Litigation, Delayed Tax Payment and Evasion: The Role of Informal Credit Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 8034, CESifo.
- Feige, Edgar L., 2015.
"Reflections on the meaning and measurement of Unobserved Economies: What do we really know about the “Shadow Economy”?,"
MPRA Paper
68466, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Feige, Edgar L., 2016. "Reflections on the meaning and measurement of Unobserved Economies: What do we really know about the "Shadow Economy"," MPRA Paper 69271, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2016.
- Lee, Kangoh, 2016. "Morality, tax evasion, and equity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 97-104.
- Jean-Louis Arcand & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2005.
"Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility,"
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 57-69, June.
- Jean-Louis Arcand & Grégoire Graziosi, 2005. "Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 57-69, June.
- Jean-Louis ARCAND & Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2004. "Tax Compliance and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility," Working Papers 200403, CERDI.
- Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie Villeval, 2010.
"Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(2), pages 226-247, June.
- Giorgio Coricelli & Mateus Joffily & Claude Montmarquette & Marie Claire Villeval, 2010. "Cheating, Emotions, and Rationality: An Experiment on Tax Evasion," Post-Print halshs-00462067, HAL.
- Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2012.
"Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought,"
Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 201-207.
- Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2011. "Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought," CUDARE Working Papers 120416, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2011. "Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0m94j50t, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Tomáš Havránek & Zuzana Iršová & Karel Janda, 2011. "Demand for Gasoline Is More Price-Inelastic than Commonly Thought," Working Papers IES 2011/10, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2011.
- Kleven, Henrik & Best, Michael & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Waseem, Mazhar & Brockmeyer, Anne, 2013. "Production vs Revenue Efficiency With Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence From Pakistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 9717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2011.
"Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and the « Broken Windows » Effect : An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands,"
Working Papers
1116, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," Working Papers halshs-00948296, HAL.
- Marie Claire Villeval & Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," Post-Print halshs-00628786, HAL.
- Lefebvre, M. & Pestieau, P. & Riedl, A.M. & Villeval, M.C., 2011. "Tax evasion, welfare fraud, and "the Broken Windows" effect: an experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Lefèbvre, Mathieu & Pestieau, Pierre & Riedl, Arno & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," IZA Discussion Papers 5609, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and ”The Broken Windows” Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," CREPP Working Papers 1103, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
- Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," PSE Working Papers halshs-00948296, HAL.
- Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands," CESifo Working Paper Series 3408, CESifo.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0724. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Benson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ispgsus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.