Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment
We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of targeting incentives primarily to firms that would have invested anyway. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the "wrong" firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but may reduce it. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc indicates that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 404-413-0235|
Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mintz, Jack M. & Tsiopoulos, Thomas, 1994. "The effectiveness of corporate tax incentives for foreign investment in the presence of tax crediting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 233-255, October.
- Michael Devereux & Harold Freeman, 1995. "The impact of tax on foreign direct investment: Empirical evidence and the implications for tax integration schemes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(1), pages 85-106, February.
- Usher, Dan, 1977. "The economics of tax incentives to encourage investment in less developed countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 119-148, June.
- James R. Hines, Jr., 1998.
""Tax Sparing" and Direct Investment in Developing Countries,"
NBER Working Papers
6728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James R. Hines Jr., 2000. "Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries," NBER Chapters, in: International Taxation and Multinational Activity, pages 39-72 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George Warskett & Stanley Winer & Walter Hettich, 1998. "The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(2), pages 123-151, May.
- Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 305-22, June.
- Boozer, Michael A., 1997. "Econometric Analysis of Panel Data Badi H. Baltagi Wiley, 1995," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(05), pages 747-754, October.
- Gordon, Roger H. & Hines, James Jr, 2002.
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 28, pages 1935-1995
- Leechor, Chad & Mintz, Jack, 1993. "On the taxation of multinational corporate investment when the deferral method is used by the capital exporting country," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 75-96, May.
- Hausman, Jerry A, 1978.
"Specification Tests in Econometrics,"
Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-71, November.
- Mundlak, Yair, 1978. "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 69-85, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Benson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.