Auction Beats Posted Prices in a Small Market
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Benoît Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2002. "Auctions Beat Posted Prices in a Small Market," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 548-548, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
- Binmore, Ken & Swierzbinski, Joe & Hsu, Steven & Proulx, Chris, 1993. "Focal Points and Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 381-409.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kircher, Philipp & Kim, Kyungmin, 2013. "Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-107, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- John Kennes, 2004. "Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application," CAM Working Papers 2004-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
- Christopher Boyer & B. Brorsen & Tong Zhang, 2014. "Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 129-149, April.
- Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2006.
"The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment,"
Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 149-155, February.
- John Kennes & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2002. "The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment," Macroeconomics 0206001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian, 2002. "The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment," Working Papers 214, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
- Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a coordination device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- John Kennes & Aaron Schiff, 2003. "The Value of a Reputation System," Industrial Organization 0301011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
- Randall Wright & Philipp Kircher & Benoit Julîen & Veronica Guerrieri, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," NBER Working Papers 23884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kim, Kyungmin & Kircher, Philipp, 2013.
"Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kyungmin Kim & Philipp Kircher, 2013. "Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment," ESE Discussion Papers 235, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Julien, Benoit & Kennes, John & King, Ian Paul, 2011. "Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 80-91, March.
- Halko, Marja-Liisa & Kultti, Klaus & Niinimaki, Juha-Pekka, 2007. "Evolutionary stability of trading rules in an urn-ball matching model," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 11-15, March.
- repec:spr:joevec:v:28:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00191-017-0544-2 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:auc:wpaper:154. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Library Digital Development). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deaucnz.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.