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Dynamic Matching with Abandonment: Optimal Guarantees via Static Priority Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Nick Arnosti
  • Rad Niazadeh
  • Pranav Nuti
  • Felipe Simon

Abstract

We study stochastic dynamic matching with abandonment, a fundamental model in which agents of different types arrive over time, may abandon the market while waiting, and can be matched in pairs for rewards that depend on their types. No online policy can guarantee more than $0.5$ of the omniscient benchmark, which knows all arrival and departure times. Whether this guarantee is achievable has been a central open problem, even in special cases. We resolve this problem by showing that, on every instance, a simple static priority policy, which is computable in polynomial time, earns at least $0.5$ of the omniscient benchmark. This establishes that the optimal competitive ratio is exactly $0.5$, improving the previous best guarantee of 0.192 for the general model [Li et al. 2026; Collina et al. 2020] Our analysis rests on a key stochastic result, which is a new lower bound on the probability that some agent from a given set of types is available. Building on this bound, we develop two approaches: a primal approach that reads the priorities from an optimal solution of a novel linear program, and a dual approach that assigns a ``value'' to each type, and prioritizes matches with high ``surplus'' (reward minus value of involved agents). These values are the unique solution of a fixed-point equation derived from linear programming duality. We also show that the two approaches are closely connected.

Suggested Citation

  • Nick Arnosti & Rad Niazadeh & Pranav Nuti & Felipe Simon, 2026. "Dynamic Matching with Abandonment: Optimal Guarantees via Static Priority Policies," Papers 2610.12991, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.12991
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    References listed on IDEAS

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