IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2610.05823.html

Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation

Author

Listed:
  • Haonan Huang
  • Joey Xiao

Abstract

Personal AI assistants are beginning to transact for consumers, and early adopters capture real savings. Whether those savings survive, and what happens to consumers who have no assistant, depends on how sellers respond -- a question single-user evidence cannot answer. We build an agent-based rental market in which language models play consumers, assistants, and six adaptive sellers guided by an algorithmic pricing tool. Half the population receives an assistant under an advisory or an executing mandate; the contract pairs a fee only the renter's physical action avoids with a pre-selected add-on an authorised assistant can cancel online. An analytical benchmark and a behaviourally calibrated rule market supply ex-ante predictions, and paired branches with frozen versus adaptive sellers separate adoption effects from market feedback. Across thirty simulated markets, executing assistants cut adopters' spending by 13.7 USD per renter-day when sellers are frozen; adaptation claws back about a third, leaving 8.7, with the gains arriving both as lower bills and as rentals completed at all. Sellers raise headline rates while cutting fees, and the calibrated forecast of the burden on unassisted consumers (+3.6) does not transfer: their mean spending change is +0.4, confidence interval -0.6 to +1.3. Seller-model swaps and a within-market transfer of fee-setting to the pricing tool show that fee conduct, and with it the division of the gains, is decided on the seller side. Assistants, we conclude, should be evaluated at market level -- completion, total spending, and non-users included -- and the comparison layers locate exactly where a calibrated behavioural forecast fails in a language-model market.

Suggested Citation

  • Haonan Huang & Joey Xiao, 2026. "Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation," Papers 2610.05823, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.05823
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.05823
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2012. "Consumer Protection and Contingent Charges," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 477-493, June.
    2. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2018. "Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets," Chapters, in: Victor J. Tremblay & Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 3, pages 40-74, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Davood Wadi & Yu Ma, 2026. "Shopping by algorithm: How agentic AI deploys human heuristics as a surrogate consumer," Papers 2609.28372, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2026.
    4. Paul Heidhues & Botond Kőszegi & Takeshi Murooka, 2017. "Inferior Products and Profitable Deception," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(1), pages 323-356.
    5. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Choice Complexity and Market Competition," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, October.
    6. Sumit Agarwal & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, 2015. "Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 111-164.
    7. Yannis Bakos & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, 2014. "Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35.
    8. Tom Blake & Sarah Moshary & Kane Sweeney & Steve Tadelis, 2021. "Price Salience and Product Choice," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 619-636, July.
    9. Jennifer Brown & Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, 2010. "Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(2), pages 859-876.
    10. Davood Wadi & Yu Ma, 2026. "Does Rank Still Matter? Position Bias When AI Agents Shop on Our Behalf," Papers 2608.22697, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2026.
    11. Pawel Struski & Jakub Swistak & Inez Okulska & Przemyslaw Biecek, 2026. "Competitive Market Behavior of LLMs," Papers 2609.02580, arXiv.org.
    12. ,, 2006. "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 207-231, June.
    13. Argyle, Lisa P. & Busby, Ethan C. & Fulda, Nancy & Gubler, Joshua R. & Rytting, Christopher & Wingate, David, 2023. "Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 337-351, July.
    14. Benjamin Balzer & Benjamin Young, 2026. "The Depth and Reach of Exploitation: Contracting with Endogenously Naive Consumers," Papers 2609.25509, arXiv.org.
    15. Lingxiu Dong & Kaiwen Luo & Fasheng Xu, 2026. "From Product Search to Preference Articulation: The Economics of Agentic Commerce," Papers 2608.08395, arXiv.org.
    16. Mingyang Fu & Ming Hu, 2026. "Strategic Buying Agents," Papers 2607.04708, arXiv.org.
    17. Glenn Ellison, 2005. "A Model of Add-On Pricing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(2), pages 585-637.
    18. Yi-Lin Tsai & Yung-Hsiu & Lai, 2026. "Seeing Is Not Perceiving: When Synthetic Consumers Can and Cannot Pretest Visual Marketing," Papers 2609.25677, arXiv.org.
    19. Se Yan & Han Zhong & Zemin & Zhong & Wenyu Zhou, 2026. "Shopping with a Platform AI Assistant: Who Adopts, When in the Journey, and What For," Papers 2603.24947, arXiv.org.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ambre Nicolle & Christos Genakos & Tobias Kretschmer, 2025. "Strategic confusopoly: evidence from the UK mobile telecommunications market," Working Papers 202503, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. McGowan, Feidhlim, 2018. "The roaming regulation and the case for applying behavioural industrial organisation to EU competition policy," Papers WP598, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    3. Ernst Fehr & Keyu Wu, 2021. "Obfuscation in competitive markets," ECON - Working Papers 391, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2023.
    4. Janssen, Aljoscha & Kasinger, Johannes, 2021. "Obfuscation and rational inattention in digitalized markets," SAFE Working Paper Series 306, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    5. Janssen, Aljoscha & Kasinger, Johannes, 2021. "Obfuscation and Rational Inattention in Digitalized Markets," Working Paper Series 1379, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Hans‐Theo Normann & Tobias Wenzel, 2019. "Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1705-1727, October.
    7. Gamp, Tobias & Krähmer, Daniel, 2022. "Competition in Search Markets with Naive Consumers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 364, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2022. "Complex Disclosure," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3236-3261, May.
    9. Lu Liu, 2019. "Non-salient fees in the mortgage market," Bank of England Staff Working Paper series 819, Bank of England.
    10. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Krähmer, 2022. "Competition in search markets with naive consumers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 356-385, June.
    11. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Deception and Competition in Search Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_014_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    12. Ambre Elsas-Nicolle & Christos Genakos & Tobias Kretschmer, 2026. "Strategic Confusopoly: Evidence from the UK Mobile Telecommunications Market," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(2), pages 272-292, June.
    13. Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC), 2025. "Study on behavioural economics for efficient regulation and supervision," Colección Estudios de Mercado E/CNMC/002/23_ENG, Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC).
    14. Bourguignon, Hélène & Gomes, Renato & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards, discounts and surcharges," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 99-144.
    15. Wenzel, Tobias, 2024. "Collusion, inattentive consumers and shrouded prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 579-591.
    16. She, Huixin, 2026. "Platform Governance and Information Disclosure in Markets with Add-Ons," TSE Working Papers 26-1778, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    17. Sule Alan & Mehmet Cemalcılar & Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2015. "Unshrouding Effects on Demand for a Costly Add-on: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey," NBER Working Papers 20956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Wenzel, Tobias, 2014. "Consumer myopia, competition and the incentives to unshroud add-on information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 89-96.
    19. K. Jeremy Ko & Jared Williams, 2017. "The Effects of Regulating Hidden Add‐On Costs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(1), pages 39-74, February.
    20. Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2020. "Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 836-857.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2610.05823. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.