Evaluating Threshold Policies in Randomized Threshold Designs: A Cautionary Tale for Regression Discontinuity Designs

Many policies assign treatment according to whether a score crosses a cutoff. Regression discontinuity (RD) designs identify the effect of treatment assignment, but the threshold policy itself may also reshape individuals' incentives, inducing behavioral responses that affect outcomes even holding treatment status fixed---a channel that conventional RD designs cannot capture. We develop a framework that exploits randomized variation in policy thresholds, together with rank-invariance-type restrictions, to identify the treatment-assignment and incentive-response effects. We illustrate the empirical relevance of this distinction using data from a merit-based scholarship experiment in Malawi. In this illustration, the conventional RD estimate is positive, while the incentive-response effect is negative and more than twice as large in magnitude. These findings suggest that threshold policies may generate unintended adverse behavioral responses, potentially reflecting discouragement induced by demanding thresholds, and caution against relying solely on conventional RD estimates when evaluating threshold policies.