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Tournaments with Managerial Discretion

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  • Peiran Xiao
  • Hashim Zaman

Abstract

We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear--Rosen--style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head start (or handicap)---an advantage (or disadvantage) in the output comparison---granted to the manager. The head start affects output through three channels: (i) encouraging the manager, (ii) discouraging the new hire, and (iii) inducing the manager to hire a stronger candidate. The hiring effect dominates the discouragement effect until the strongest candidate is hired; beyond that point, any further head start discourages the new hire more than it encourages the manager. The optimal contract therefore grants a head start just large enough to induce the manager to hire the strongest candidate.

Suggested Citation

  • Peiran Xiao & Hashim Zaman, 2026. "Tournaments with Managerial Discretion," Papers 2609.04068, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.04068
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Dmitry Ryvkin & Andreas Ortmann, 2008. "The Predictive Power of Three Prominent Tournament Formats," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(3), pages 492-504, March.
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