IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2607.28925.html

Learning Optimal Dynamic Matching via Graph Neural Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Genta Okada
  • Shunya Noda
  • Junpei Komiyama
  • Akira Matsushita

Abstract

Dynamic matching markets require decisions about whom to match and when: matching now yields value but removes participants who may create better future opportunities. We develop a value-based reinforcement-learning framework for this problem on finite, evolving weighted graphs. We study an infinite-horizon continuous-time model with stochastic arrivals, node-type transitions, edge realizations, and exogenous exits. We prove an event-time reduction: without loss of optimality, the planner acts immediately after each exogenous event and then waits for the next one. We further show that the optimal edge-wise $Q$-function is characterized by a single continuation-value function on post-decision residual graphs, reducing the learned object from state-action values to graph values. Exact action selection still requires combinatorial matching optimization; we approximate the value with a graph neural network, train it by temporal-difference learning, and use it in a forward-greedy matching heuristic. In a binary-type benchmark, the learned policy substantially outperforms immediate and threshold-greedy rules by preserving common nodes for rare arrivals of valuable matches while forming lower-value matches only in thick pools. In a kidney paired donation benchmark, it performs similarly to immediate greedy when exits are unpredictable, recovers the logic of patient matching when warnings are reliable, and outperforms the better of Immediate Greedy and Patient Greedy across intermediate warning probabilities. These results show that residual-graph value learning yields state-dependent dynamic matching policies that adapt to realized connectivity and exit information.

Suggested Citation

  • Genta Okada & Shunya Noda & Junpei Komiyama & Akira Matsushita, 2026. "Learning Optimal Dynamic Matching via Graph Neural Networks," Papers 2607.28925, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.28925
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.28925
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ross Anderson & Itai Ashlagi & David Gamarnik & Yash Kanoria, 2017. "Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(6), pages 1446-1459, December.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    3. Ali Aouad & Ömer Sarıtaç, 2022. "Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(4), pages 2349-2383, July.
    4. Itai Ashlagi & Maximilien Burq & Patrick Jaillet & Vahideh Manshadi, 2019. "On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(4), pages 927-949, July.
    5. Yilun Chen & Yash Kanoria & Akshit Kumar & Wenxin Zhang, 2026. "Feature-Based Dynamic Matching," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 74(2), pages 788-803, March.
    6. Myungeun Eom & Alejandro Toriello, 2026. "Batching and Greedy Policies: How Good Are They in Dynamic Matching?," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 479-495, March.
    7. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li & Shayan Oveis Gharan, 2020. "Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 783-815.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Barkel, Mathijs & Colley, Rachael & Delorme, Maxence & Manlove, David & Pettersson, William, 2026. "Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: A literature survey and empirical evaluation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 331(2), pages 325-350.
    2. Zhiyuan Chen & Rui & Chen & Ming Hu & Yun Zhou, 2026. "Dynamic Matching Under Patience Imbalance," Papers 2602.03995, arXiv.org.
    3. Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & YingHua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2025. "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 92(4), pages 2108-2164.
    4. Naonori Kakimura & Donghao Zhu, 2021. "Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and Departures," Papers 2110.10824, arXiv.org.
    5. René Caldentey & Lisa Aoki Hillas & Varun Gupta, 2025. "Designing Service Menus for Bipartite Queueing Systems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(3), pages 1496-1534, May.
    6. Süleyman Kerimov & Itai Ashlagi & Itai Gurvich, 2024. "Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 2799-2822, May.
    7. Irene Lo & Vahideh Manshadi & Scott Rodilitz & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement," Papers 2005.10731, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    8. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021. "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers 2021-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    10. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    11. Jhan-Jia Lin & Yu-Tse Lee & Ja-Ling Wu, 2021. "The Effect of Thickness-Based Dynamic Matching Mechanism on a Hyperledger Fabric-Based TimeBank System," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-21, March.
    12. Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Vahideh Manshadi & Alexander Wei, 2023. "Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4609-4626, August.
    13. Danny Segev, 2025. "Near-Optimal Adaptive Policies for Serving Stochastically Departing Customers," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 73(5), pages 2744-2760, September.
    14. Irene Lo & Vahideh Manshadi & Scott Rodilitz & Ali Shameli, 2024. "Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 1787-1805, September.
    15. Doval, Laura & Szentes, Balázs, 2025. "On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 106-130.
    16. Jose H. Blanchet & Martin I. Reiman & Virag Shah & Lawrence M. Wein & Linjia Wu, 2022. "Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(6), pages 3355-3370, November.
    17. Kratz, Jörgen, 2024. "Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    18. Ruiqi Zhou & Donghao Zhu & Houcai Shen, 2026. "A Learning-Based Hybrid Decision Framework for Matching Systems with User Departure Detection," Papers 2602.22412, arXiv.org.
    19. Philipp Afèche & René Caldentey & Varun Gupta, 2022. "On the Optimal Design of a Bipartite Matching Queueing System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(1), pages 363-401, January.
    20. Itai Ashlagi & Maximilien Burq & Chinmoy Dutta & Patrick Jaillet & Amin Saberi & Chris Sholley, 2023. "Edge-Weighted Online Windowed Matching," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 48(2), pages 999-1016, May.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.28925. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.