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A Learning-Based Hybrid Decision Framework for Matching Systems with User Departure Detection

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  • Ruiqi Zhou
  • Donghao Zhu
  • Houcai Shen

Abstract

In matching markets such as kidney exchanges and freight exchanges, delayed matching has been shown to improve overall market efficiency. The benefits of delay are highly sensitive to participants' sojourn times and departure behavior, and delaying matches can impose significant costs, including longer waiting times and increased market congestion. These competing effects make fixed matching policies inherently inflexible in dynamic environments. We propose a learning-based Hybrid framework that adaptively combines immediate and delayed matching. The framework continuously collects data on user departures over time, estimates the underlying departure distribution via regression, and determines whether to delay matching in the subsequent period based on a decision threshold that governs the system's tolerance for matching efficiency loss. The proposed framework can substantially reduce waiting times and congestion while sacrificing only a limited amount of matching efficiency. By dynamically adjusting its matching strategy, the Hybrid framework enables system performance to flexibly interpolate between purely greedy and purely patient policies, offering a robust and adaptive alternative to static matching mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruiqi Zhou & Donghao Zhu & Houcai Shen, 2026. "A Learning-Based Hybrid Decision Framework for Matching Systems with User Departure Detection," Papers 2602.22412, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2602.22412
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    3. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    4. Margarida Carvalho & Xenia Klimentova & Kristiaan Glorie & Ana Viana & Miguel Constantino, 2021. "Robust Models for the Kidney Exchange Problem," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 861-881, July.
    5. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li & Shayan Oveis Gharan, 2020. "Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 783-815.
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