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On click-fraud under pro-rata revenue sharing rule

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  • Hao Yu

Abstract

Click-fraud is commonly seen as a key vulnerability of pro-rata revenue sharing rule on music streaming platforms, whereas user-centric is largely immune. This paper develops a tractable non-cooperative model in which artists can purchase fraud activity that generates undetectable fake streams up to a technological limit. We defend pro-rata by showing that it is fraud-robust: when fraud technology is weak, honesty is a strictly dominant strategy, and an efficient fraud-free equilibrium obtains; when fraud technology is strong, a unique fraud equilibrium arises, yet aggregate fake streams remain bounded. Although fraud is inefficient, the resulting redistribution may improve fairness in some cases. To mitigate fraud without abandoning pro-rata, we introduce a parametric weighted rule that interpolates between pro-rata and user-centric, and characterize parameter ranges that restore a fraud-free equilibrium under technology constraint. We also discuss implications of Spotify's modernized royalty system for fraud incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Hao Yu, 2026. "On click-fraud under pro-rata revenue sharing rule," Papers 2601.09573, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2601.09573
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2025. "Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(10), pages 8319-8335, October.
    2. Abheek Ghosh & Tzeh Yuan Neoh & Nicholas Teh & Giannis Tyrovolas, 2025. "Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms," Papers 2511.04465, arXiv.org.
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    4. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
    5. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Pro-rata vs User-centric in the music streaming industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
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