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Agentic AI and Hallucinations

Author

Listed:
  • Engin Iyidogan
  • Ali I. Ozkes

Abstract

We model a competitive market where AI agents buy answers from upstream generative models and resell them to users who differ in how much they value accuracy and in how much they fear hallucinations. Agents can privately exert effort for costly verification to lower hallucination risks. Since interactions halt in the event of a hallucination, the threat of losing future rents disciplines effort. A unique reputational equilibrium exists under nontrivial discounting. The equilibrium effort, and thus the price, increases with the share of users who have high accuracy concerns, implying that hallucination-sensitive sectors, such as law and medicine, endogenously lead to more serious verification efforts in agentic AI markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Engin Iyidogan & Ali I. Ozkes, 2025. "Agentic AI and Hallucinations," Papers 2507.19183, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2507.19183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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