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Arbitrage on Decentralized Exchanges

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  • Xue Dong He
  • Chen Yang
  • Yutian Zhou

Abstract

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are alternative venues to centralized exchanges (CEXs) for trading cryptocurrencies and have become increasingly popular. An arbitrage opportunity arises when the exchange rate of two cryptocurrencies in a DEX differs from that in a CEX. Arbitrageurs can then trade on the DEX and CEX to make a profit. Trading on the DEX incurs a gas fee, which determines the priority of the trade being executed. We study a gas-fee competition game between two arbitrageurs who maximize their expected profit from trading. We derive the unique symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium and find that (i) the arbitrageurs may choose not to trade when the arbitrage opportunity and liquidity is small; (ii) the probability of the arbitrageurs choosing a higher gas fee is lower; (iii) the arbitrageurs pay a higher gas fee and trade more when the arbitrage opportunity becomes larger and when liquidity becomes higher; (iv) the arbitrageurs' expected profit could increase with arbitrage opportunity and liquidity. The above findings are consistent with our empirical study.

Suggested Citation

  • Xue Dong He & Chen Yang & Yutian Zhou, 2025. "Arbitrage on Decentralized Exchanges," Papers 2507.08302, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2507.08302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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