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Expert Classification Aggregation

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Fioravanti

Abstract

We consider the problem where a set of individuals has to classify $m$ objects into $p$ categories by aggregating the individual classifications, and no category can be left empty. An aggregator satisfies \emph{Expertise} if individuals are decisive either over the classification of a given object, or the classification into a given category. We show that requiring an aggregator to satisfy \emph{Expertise} (or variants of it) and be either unanimous or independent leads to numerous impossibility results.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Fioravanti, 2024. "Expert Classification Aggregation," Papers 2409.11033, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2409.11033
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cailloux, Olivier & Hervouin, Matthieu & Ozkes, Ali I. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2024. "Classification aggregation without unanimity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 6-9.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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