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Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes

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  • Tamura, Shohei

Abstract

We study the problem of selecting prize winners from a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such rules. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.

Suggested Citation

  • Tamura, Shohei, 2016. "Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 41-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:41-46
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Moulin, Herve & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2008. "Impartial division of a dollar," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 176-191, March.
    2. Shohei Tamura & Shinji Ohseto, 2014. "Impartial nomination correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 47-54, June.
    3. Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 173-196, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Amorós, Pablo, 2021. "Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    2. Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Optimal Impartial Correspondences," Papers 2301.04544, arXiv.org.
    3. Amorós, Pablo, 2022. "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    4. Andrew Mackenzie, 2020. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 713-743, April.
    5. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2018. "A Game of the Throne of Saint Peter," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Javier Cembrano & Felix Fischer & Max Klimm, 2023. "Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection," Papers 2305.09998, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional design; Award rules; Conflict of interest; Impartiality; Plurality correspondence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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