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Expert Classification Aggregation

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Fioravanti

    (University of Amsterdam/UNS-CONICET)

Abstract

We consider the problem where a set of individuals has to classify m objects into p categories by aggregating the individual classifications, and no category can be left empty. An aggregator satisfies Expertise if individuals are decisive either over the classification of a given object, or the classification into a given category. We show that requiring an aggregator to satisfy Expertise and be either unanimous or independent leads to numerous impossibility results

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Fioravanti, 2024. "Expert Classification Aggregation," Working Papers 339, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:339
    as

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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/339.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
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    5. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2021. "Alternative Axioms in Group Identification Problems," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 38(2), pages 353-362, July.
    6. Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 173-196, January.
    7. Federico Fioravanti & Fernando Tohmé, 2021. "Alternative Axioms in Group Identification Problems," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 38(2), pages 353-362, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Classification Aggregation; Expertise;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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