IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2407.17884.html

Generalization of Zhou fixed point theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Lu Yu

Abstract

We give two generalizations of the Zhou fixed point theorem. They weaken the subcompleteness condition of values, and relax the ascending condition of the correspondence. As an application, we derive a generalization of Topkis's theorem on the existence and order structure of the set of Nash equilibria of supermodular games.

Suggested Citation

  • Lu Yu, 2024. "Generalization of Zhou fixed point theorem," Papers 2407.17884, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.17884
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.17884
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    2. Sabarwal, Tarun, 2025. "General theory of equilibrium in models with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    3. Federico Echenique, 2005. "A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 215-218, June.
    4. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games," Papers 2406.13783, arXiv.org.
    5. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities," Papers 2407.00636, arXiv.org.
    6. Lu Yu, 2024. "Existence and structure of Nash equilibria for supermodular games," Papers 2406.09582, arXiv.org.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lu Yu, 2024. "Order-theoretical fixed point theorems for correspondences and application in game theory," Papers 2407.18582, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lu Yu, 2024. "Order-theoretical fixed point theorems for correspondences and application in game theory," Papers 2407.18582, arXiv.org.
    2. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2024. "Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 182-198, June.
    3. Balbus, Łukasz & Olszewski, Wojciech & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2025. "A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    4. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities," Papers 2407.00636, arXiv.org.
    5. Miyauchi, Yuhei, 2016. "Structural estimation of pairwise stable networks with nonnegative externality," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 195(2), pages 224-235.
    6. Jaeok Park & Doo Hyung Yun, 2023. "Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 205-228, August.
    7. Federico Quartieri, 2013. "Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 553-579, February.
    8. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games," Papers 2406.13783, arXiv.org.
    9. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2013. "A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 422-430.
    10. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Lau, Sau-Him Paul, 2001. "Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, II: Strategic Complementarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 199-231, June.
    12. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    13. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    14. Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Machowska, Dominika & Topolyan, Iryna, 2025. "Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 93-105.
    15. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    16. Ali Hortacsu & Olivia R. Natan & Hayden Parsley & Timothy Schwieg & Kevin R. Williams, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2312R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2023.
    17. Light, Bar & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2018. "Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics," Research Papers 3731, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    18. Echenique, Federico, 2004. "A characterization of strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 325-347, February.
    19. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Stark, Oded, 1993. "How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 149-155, May.
    20. , & , & ,, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.17884. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.