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A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

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Listed:
  • Meng-Jhang Fong
  • Po-Hsuan Lin
  • Thomas R. Palfrey

Abstract

In this short note, we compare the cursed sequential equilibrium (CSE) by Fong et al. (2023) and the sequential cursed equilibrium (SCE) by Cohen and Li (2023). We identify eight main differences between CSE and SCE with respect to the following features: (1) the family of applicable games, (2) the number of free parameters, (3) the belief updating process, (4) the treatment of public histories, (5) effects in games of complete information, (6) violations of subgame perfection and sequential rationality, (7) re-labeling of actions, and (8) effects in one-stage simultaneous-move games.

Suggested Citation

  • Meng-Jhang Fong & Po-Hsuan Lin & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2023. "A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium," Papers 2304.05515, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2304.05515
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    4. Shani Cohen & Shengwu Li, 2022. "Sequential Cursed Equilibrium," Papers 2212.06025, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2025.
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