The Complexity of Debt Swapping
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- José Alcalde, 1995. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2023-04-03 (Banking)
- NEP-NET-2023-04-03 (Network Economics)
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