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Conditions for none to be whipped by `Rank and Yank' under the majority rule

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  • Fujun Hou

Abstract

`Rank and Yank' is practiced in many organizations. This paper is concerned with the condtions for none to be whipped by `Rank and Yank' when the evaluation data under each criterion are assumed to be ordinal rankings and the majority rule is used. Two sufficient conditions are set forth of which the first one formulates the alternatives indifference definition in terms of the election matrix, while the second one specifies a certain balance in the probabilities of alternatives being ranked at positions. In a sense, `none to be whipped' means that the organization is of stability. Thus the second sufficient condition indicates an intrinsic relation of balance and organization stability. In addition, directions for future research are put forward.

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  • Fujun Hou, 2022. "Conditions for none to be whipped by `Rank and Yank' under the majority rule," Papers 2208.05093, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2208.05093
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