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Information Design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication

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Listed:
  • Brendan T. Gould
  • Philip N. Brown

Abstract

The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicular ad hoc networks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each other of road hazards. However, research on other transportation information systems has shown that informing only a subset of drivers of road conditions may have a perverse effect of increasing congestion. In the context of a simple (yet novel) model of V2V hazard information sharing, we ask whether partial adoption of this technology can similarly lead to undesirable outcomes. In our model, drivers individually choose how recklessly to behave as a function of information received from other V2V-enabled cars, and the resulting aggregate behavior influences the likelihood of accidents (and thus the information propagated by the vehicular network). We fully characterize the game-theoretic equilibria of this model using our new equilibrium concept. Our model indicates that for a wide range of the parameter space, V2V information sharing surprisingly increases the equilibrium frequency of accidents relative to no V2V information sharing, and that it may increase equilibrium social cost as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Brendan T. Gould & Philip N. Brown, 2022. "Information Design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication," Papers 2207.06411, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2207.06411
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    2. Dafermos, Stella & Nagurney, Anna, 1984. "On some traffic equilibrium theory paradoxes," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 101-110, April.
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