IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2112.09975.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier

Author

Listed:
  • Annie Liang
  • Jay Lu
  • Xiaosheng Mu
  • Kyohei Okumura

Abstract

Algorithm designers increasingly optimize not only for accuracy, but also for the fairness of the algorithm across pre-defined groups. We study the tradeoff between fairness and accuracy for any given set of inputs to the algorithm. We propose and characterize a fairness-accuracy frontier, which consists of the optimal points across a broad range of preferences over fairness and accuracy. Our results identify a simple property of the inputs, group-balance, which qualitatively determines the shape of the frontier. We further study an information-design problem where the designer flexibly regulates the inputs (e.g., by coarsening an input or banning its use) but the algorithm is chosen by another agent. Whether it is optimal to ban an input generally depends on the designer's preferences. But when inputs are group-balanced, then excluding group identity is strictly suboptimal for all designers, and when the designer has access to group identity, then it is strictly suboptimal to exclude any informative input.

Suggested Citation

  • Annie Liang & Jay Lu & Xiaosheng Mu & Kyohei Okumura, 2021. "Algorithm Design: A Fairness-Accuracy Frontier," Papers 2112.09975, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2112.09975
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2112.09975
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Arnold & Will Dobbie & Peter Hull, 2021. "Measuring Racial Discrimination in Algorithms," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 111, pages 49-54, May.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    3. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    4. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(5), pages 434-434.
    5. Christopher Jung & Sampath Kannan & Changhwa Lee & Mallesh M. Pai & Aaron Roth & Rakesh Vohra, 2020. "Fair Prediction with Endogenous Behavior," Papers 2002.07147, arXiv.org.
    6. Jon Kleinberg & Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan & Ashesh Rambachan, 2018. "Algorithmic Fairness," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 22-27, May.
    7. Talia Gillis & Bryce McLaughlin & Jann Spiess, 2021. "On the Fairness of Machine-Assisted Human Decisions," Papers 2110.15310, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2022. "Advisory algorithms and liability rules," Working Papers 2022-04, CRESE.
    2. Kai Hao Yang & Philipp Strack, 2023. "Privacy Preserving Signals," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2379, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    2. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
    4. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Isaiah Andrews & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2021. "A Model of Scientific Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2117-2142, September.
    6. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    7. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    8. Liu, Yixuan & Whinston, Andrew B., 2019. "Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 14-26.
    9. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    10. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    11. Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    12. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Righi, Simone, 2019. "The price of discovering your needs online," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 317-330.
    13. Ozan Candogan & Kimon Drakopoulos, 2020. "Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 497-515, March.
    14. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
      • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    15. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
    16. Kimon Drakopoulos & Shobhit Jain & Ramandeep Randhawa, 2021. "Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 828-853, February.
    17. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
    18. Christoph SchottmÑŒller, 2019. "Welfare optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Working Paper Series in Economics 98, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    19. Sung Jae Jun & Sokbae Lee, 2023. "Identifying the Effect of Persuasion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(8), pages 2032-2058.
    20. Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2112.09975. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.