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Group network effects in price competition

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  • Renato Soeiro
  • Alberto Pinto

Abstract

The partition of society into groups, polarization, and social networks are part of most conversations today. How do they influence price competition? We discuss Bertrand duopoly equilibria with demand subject to network effects. Contrary to models where network effects depend on one aggregate variable (demand for each choice), partitioning the dependence into groups creates a wealth of pure price equilibria with profit for both price setters, even if positive network effects are the dominant element of the game. If there is some asymmetry in how groups interact, two groups are sufficient. If network effects are based on undirected and unweighted graphs, at least five groups are required but, without other differentiation, outcomes are symmetric.

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  • Renato Soeiro & Alberto Pinto, 2021. "Group network effects in price competition," Papers 2110.05891, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2110.05891
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    References listed on IDEAS

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