IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/1802.08935.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Identifying the occurrence or non occurrence of cognitive bias in situations resembling the Monty Hall problem

Author

Listed:
  • Fatemeh Borhani
  • Edward J. Green

Abstract

People reason heuristically in situations resembling inferential puzzles such as Bertrand's box paradox and the Monty Hall problem. The practical significance of that fact for economic decision making is uncertain because a departure from sound reasoning may, but does not necessarily, result in a "cognitively biased" outcome different from what sound reasoning would have produced. Criteria are derived here, applicable to both experimental and non-experimental situations, for heuristic reasoning in an inferential-puzzle situations to result, or not to result, in cognitively bias. In some situations, neither of these criteria is satisfied, and whether or not agents' posterior probability assessments or choices are cognitively biased cannot be determined.

Suggested Citation

  • Fatemeh Borhani & Edward J. Green, 2018. "Identifying the occurrence or non occurrence of cognitive bias in situations resembling the Monty Hall problem," Papers 1802.08935, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1802.08935
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08935
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    2. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    3. Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "Monty Hall's Three Doors: Construction and Deconstruction of a Choice Anomaly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 933-946, September.
    4. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barash, Jori & Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Kodaverdian, Niree, 2019. "Heuristic to Bayesian: The evolution of reasoning from childhood to adulthood," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 305-322.
    2. Duarte Gonçalves & Jonathan Libgober & Jack Willis, 2021. "Learning versus Unlearning: An Experiment on Retractions," NBER Working Papers 29512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hausken, Kjell & Levitin, Gregory, 2009. "Minmax defense strategy for complex multi-state systems," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 577-587.
    2. Giovanni. Gavetti & Daniel A. Levinthal, 2004. "50th Anniversay Article: The Strategy Field from the Perspective of Management Science: Divergent Strands and Possible Integration," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1309-1318, October.
    3. He, Wei & Sun, Xiang, 2014. "On the diffuseness of incomplete information game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 131-137.
    4. Łukasz Balbus & Paweł Dziewulski & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2015. "Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 201-243, May.
    5. Kjell Hausken, 2019. "Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 16(2), pages 105-127, June.
    6. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul, 2011. "Do consumers prefer offers that are easy to compare? An experimental investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    7. Bąk Sylwia, 2020. "The problem of uncertainty and risk as a subject of research of the Nobel Prize Laureates in Economic Sciences," Journal of Economics and Management, Sciendo, vol. 39(1), pages 21-40, March.
    8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
    9. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
    10. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
    11. Hausken, Kjell & Plümper, Thomas & Schneider, Gerald, 2002. "The Trilemma of the Protectionist Autocrat: An Assessment of the Political Determinants of Foreign Economic Liberalization," MPRA Paper 75866, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Hausken, Kjell & Mattli, Walter & Plümper, Thomas, 2006. "Widening versus Deepening of International Unions," MPRA Paper 75882, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Michael Trost, 2014. "On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-032, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    14. Edgardo Bucciarelli & Andrea Oliva, 2020. "Arrow’s impossibility theorem as a special case of Nash equilibrium: a cognitive approach to the theory of collective decision-making," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 19(1), pages 15-41, June.
    15. Trost, Michael, 2019. "On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-37.
    16. Anne Isla, 2000. "De la rationalité complexe à la rationalité procédurale : la relation système observé et système observant," Post-Print hal-01916150, HAL.
    17. Beißner, Patrick & Khan, M. Ali, 2019. "On Hurwicz–Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 470-490.
    18. Ilan Nehama, 2016. "Analyzing Games with Ambiguous Player Types Using the MINthenMAX Decision Model," Discussion Paper Series dp700, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    19. Güth, Werner, 2010. "Satisficing and (un)bounded rationality--A formal definition and its experimental validity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 308-316, March.
    20. Anne Isla, 2000. "From procedural to complex rationality relations: Observed system and observing system," Post-Print hal-01916407, HAL.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1802.08935. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.