Mercado de TV Paga no Brasil: Competição Normal Ou Infracionária?
The antitrust authorities have had difficulties to proceed since there are both ambiguity and asymmetric information on firms’ actions. In others words, many controversy appears from the analysis of the reasons and effects of the firms’ specific conduct. This can be seen in the recent DTH Brazilian case conduced by the national antitrust authority (CADE). Some limitations in this case can be highlighted in terms of: the official returns; the related legislation; the specification of the occurred infraction. Beyond, it is missing the strategic interaction aspects of the market. With these questions in mind, the general objective is to organize ideas considering the limitations indicated. The conclusions are: a) the product differentiation promoted by the entrant didn’t reach levels that could justify its condemnation; b) the incumbent had a cooperative behavior followed by a non cooperative one. The possible explanations to that are: a strategic error of the Directv by doesn’t create previous difficulties to the rival entry, maybe because the antitrust authority has credible threat to condemnation; the necessity to look a puppy dog to sustain future agreements with the entrant.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Prof Marcos Valdemar de Freitas Reis s/n Campus do Gragoatá Bloco F Niterói, RJ 24210-201 Brazil|
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Web page: http://www.anpec.org.br
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Prof Marcos Valdemar de Freitas Reis s/n Campus do Gragoatá Bloco F Niterói, RJ 24210-201 Brazil|
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- Dixit, Avinash, 1980.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Harold Demsetz, 1981. "Barriers to Entry," UCLA Economics Working Papers 192, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
- Roger Ware, 1991. "Entry Deterrence," Working Papers 837, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Phlips,Louis, 1995. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521498715, Diciembre.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1983. "Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An Exploratory Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 636-653, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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