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The Impacts of Alternative Institutions on Distributional and Environmental Efficiency in Environmental Programs

Author

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  • Buller, Virginia
  • Hudson, Darren

Abstract

Experimental auctions are used to examine the impacts of alternative constraints on environmental programs. Results show that use of a monetary constraint results in greater environmental efficiency at a lower total cost as compared to an acreage constraint.

Suggested Citation

  • Buller, Virginia & Hudson, Darren, 2006. "The Impacts of Alternative Institutions on Distributional and Environmental Efficiency in Environmental Programs," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35423, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:saeaso:35423
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/35423
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parkhurst, Gregory M & Shogren, Jason F, 2005. "Evaluating incentive mechanisms for conserving habitat," MPRA Paper 34552, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Michael A. Taylor & Brent Sohngen & Alan Randall & Helen Pushkarskaya, 2004. "Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1196-1202.
    3. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Auction Design for Voluntary Conservation Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1211-1217.
    4. Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wright, Andrew P. & Hudson, Darren, 2013. "Applying a Voluntary Incentive Mechanism to the Problem of Groundwater Conservation: An Experimental Approach," 2013 Annual Meeting, February 2-5, 2013, Orlando, Florida 143030, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.

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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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