The Impacts of Alternative Institutions on Distributional and Environmental Efficiency in Environmental Programs
Experimental auctions are used to examine the impacts of alternative constraints on environmental programs. Results show that use of a monetary constraint results in greater environmental efficiency at a lower total cost as compared to an acreage constraint.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Auction Design for Voluntary Conservation Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1211-1217.
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
- Parkhurst, Gregory M & Shogren, Jason F, 2005. "Evaluating incentive mechanisms for conserving habitat," MPRA Paper 34552, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michael A. Taylor & Brent Sohngen & Alan Randall & Helen Pushkarskaya, 2004. "Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1196-1202.
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