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The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town

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  • Hartwick, John

Abstract

We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortied village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of nancing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartwick, John, 2006. "The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273572, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:273572
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273572
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    References listed on IDEAS

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