Market-Based Approaches to Pollution Control in the Lake Taupo Catchment in New Zealand
There are at least five general reasons why market-based policies fail to address some of the most basic environmental objectives. This study evaluates the available biophysical and economic data against these criteria and concludes that market-based approaches should be employed cautiously in pollution control under the present system and the available technology for farming in the lake area. The most effective market-based instrument to control pollution, in this case, seems to be negative incentives, as the public net cost of farming is extremely higher than the private net benefits. However, the intensity of taxes that would be effective in this regard would definitely results negative net farm benefits. The principle alternative, emission trading, would be effective with a highly regulated system given long-term political willingness to address the problem effectively.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.nzares.org.nz/|
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