Operationalisierungsprobleme Einer Vergleichenden Institutionenanalyse Zur Gewasserunterhaltung
When applying New Institutional Economics (NIE) to empirical studies one is confronted with typical problems of operationalization. To illustrate some of these problems, this paper utilizes a comparative institutional analysis of the German Water and Soil Associations and alternative governance structures for watercourse maintenance. It gives a brief introduction into the logic behind this approach (1) and discusses some terminological problems of NIE (2). The next sections illuminate the domain of watercourse maintenance (3), and the different governance structures organizing this function (4). Subsequently, four evaluative criteria are selected and explicated (5), and the operationalization and application of the criterion 'institutional congruence' is exemplified (6). Finally, section 7 sums up.
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- Regina Birner & Heidi Wittmer, 2004. "On the 'efficient boundaries of the state': the contribution of transaction-costs economics to the analysis of decentralization and devolution in natural resource management," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 22(5), pages 667-685, October.
- Kessides, C., 1993. "Institutional Options for Provision of Infrastructure," World Bank - Discussion Papers 212, World Bank.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
- Crew, Michael A. & Kleindorfer, Paul R., 1985. "Governance structures for natural monopoly: A comparative institutional assessment," Journal of Behavioral Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 117-140.
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