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An experimental approach to assessment of trading and allocation mechanisms for nutrient trading

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  • Marsh, Dan
  • Tucker, Steve
  • Doole, Graeme

Abstract

Regional councils throughout New Zealand are in the process of drawing up plans to enable them to meet the requirements of the Resource Management Act and the National Policy Statement on freshwater. Some councils are working on targets for nutrient leaching at the catchment level and are considering alternative approaches to ensuring these targets are achieved. In this paper we investigate the farm level effects of agricultural policies by employing the methods of experimental economics to investigate alternative mechanisms for farm and catchment level regulations aimed at improving water quality. Results are presented for four cap and trade system designs in order to assess the effect of alternative approaches to allocation of nutrient discharge allowances and rules governing trade or exchange of these allowances. The objective of this study is to assess the utility of cap and trade systems through experimental economics, with a focus on the efficiency and equity of these mechanisms. Cap and trade systems are promoted as one of the major achievements of environmental economics. However, the move from theory to field implementation is a difficult transition, particularly due to the prevalence of uncertainty and the bounded cognitive ability of real agents. Data from the experiments enables comparison of the results of nutrient trading with the outcomes that would be expected based on economic theory. This assessment of the relative performance of cap and trade systems highlights important findings for environmental regulation. First, catchment profit is around 10% lower than predicted by theory. Second, the distribution of profit among farmers has little in common with that predicted by theory. Third, the trading behaviour of farmers bears little resemblance to theoretical predictions. Overall, these findings highlight the need to carefully assess the efficiency, equity and overall benefits of cap and trade systems for environmental regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Marsh, Dan & Tucker, Steve & Doole, Graeme, 2014. "An experimental approach to assessment of trading and allocation mechanisms for nutrient trading," 2014 Conference (58th), February 4-7, 2014, Port Macquarie, Australia 167195, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aare14:167195
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.167195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Graeme J. Doole & David J. Pannell, 2012. "Empirical evaluation of nonpoint pollution policies under agent heterogeneity: regulating intensive dairy production in the Waikato region of New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 56(1), pages 82-101, January.
    2. Jordan F. Suter & Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(1), pages 86-102.
    3. Jon Ketcham & Vernon L. Smith & Arlington W. Williams, 1984. "A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(4), pages 595-614.
    4. Suter, Jordan F. & Vossler, Christian A. & Poe, Gregory L. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2008. "AJAE Appendix: Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(01), pages 1-14, February.
    5. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Ivan Moscati, 2011. "Double Auction Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Classroom Experimental Search Market," LERNA Working Papers 11.03.337, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
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    Cited by:

    1. Spicer, E. Anne & Swaffield, Simon & Moore, Kevin, 2021. "Agricultural land use management responses to a cap and trade regime for water quality in Lake Taupo catchment, New Zealand," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).

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