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Penalties, Targeting, and Performance in Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs

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  • Lichtenberg, Erik
  • Newburn, David
  • Kim, Youngho

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  • Lichtenberg, Erik & Newburn, David & Kim, Youngho, 2023. "Penalties, Targeting, and Performance in Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs," 2023 Annual Meeting, July 23-25, Washington D.C. 335794, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea22:335794
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wu, JunJie & Zilberman, David & Babcock, Bruce A., 2001. "Environmental and Distributional Impacts of Conservation Targeting Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 333-350, May.
    2. Katherine Reichelderfer & William G. Boggess, 1988. "Government Decision Making and Program Performance: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 70(1), pages 1-11.
    3. Babcock, Bruce A. & Lakshminarayan, P. G. & Wu, JunJie & Zilberman, David, 1996. "Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities (The)," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1065, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
    5. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
    6. David Zilberman, 1996. "The Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities: A Study of CRP Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 961-971.
    7. Andrea Cattaneo, 2003. "The Pursuit of Efficiency and Its Unintended Consequences: Contract Withdrawals in the Environmental Quality Incentives Program," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 449-469.
    8. Kathy Baylis & Jonathan Coppess & Benjamin M. Gramig & Paavani Sachdeva, 2022. "Agri-environmental Programs in the United States and Canada," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 83-104.
    9. Engel, Stefanie, 2016. "The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 131-177, July.
    10. Kim, Youngho & Lichtenberg, Erik & Newburn, David, 2022. "Payments and Penalties in Ecosystem Services Programs," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322103, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Marc O. Ribaudo, 1989. "Targeting the Conservation Reserve Program to Maximize Water Quality Benefits," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(4), pages 320-332.
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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Resource/Energy Economics and Policy;
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